Though Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) have surpassed human-level performance on tasks such as object classification and face verification, they can easily be fooled by adversarial attacks. These attacks add a small perturbation to the input image that causes the network to mis-classify the sample. In this paper, we focus on neutralizing adversarial attacks by exploring the effect of different loss functions such as CenterLoss and L2-Softmax Loss for enhanced robustness to adversarial perturbations. Additionally, we propose power convolution, a novel method of convolution that when incorporated in conventional CNNs improve their robustness. Power convolution ensures that features at every layer are bounded and close to each other. Extensive experiments show that Power Convolutional Networks (PCNs) neutralize multiple types of attacks, and perform better than existing methods for defending adversarial attacks.
Introduction
In recent years, CNNs have gained tremendous popularity because of their impressive performance on many vision-related tasks. They are being widely used in many practical applications such as self-driving cars, face verification, etc. However, it has been shown that CNNs are vulnerable to even small adversarial perturbations which, when added to the input image, can cause the network to misclassify with high confidence [26, 6, 18, 17] . Adversarial images thus generated are often visually indistinguishable from the original images.
Adversarial attacks have emerged as a potential threat to the CNN-based systems. Adversarial images can be used by a suspect to fool a face verification system, by letting the person go unidentified. They can be used by a hacker to surpass a face authentication system and gain unauthorized access. These attacks can also cause self-driving cars to mis-classify scene objects such as a stop sign leading to adverse effects when these systems are deployed in real time. Figure 1 . Five test samples from CIFAR10 [10] dataset (top) that are correctly classified by both CNN and PCN. Corresponding adversarial images crafted using DeepFool [18] attack and misclassified by CNN (middle) and PCN (bottom). The adversarial attacks on PCN can be detected trivially by human observer.
Due to these vulnerabilities in CNN, it is crucial to design networks that are not only accurate, but also robust to adversarial perturbations. We propose to improve network's robustness by analyzing key properties required for defending against adversarial attacks.
It has been hypothesized that CNNs learn a highly nonlinear manifold on which the images of same class lie together, while images from different class are separated. Hence, the original image and the adversarial image lying close to each other in Euclidean space, are far separated on the manifold or in feature space. When designing a robust classifier, we would like to address the following question: Does bringing the original and perturbed image closer in the feature space of a learned mapping improve its robustness? To address this question, we postulate two important properties that would enhance a network's robustness to adversarial attacks: 1) Centrality and 2) Compactness. Centrality adds an additional constraint that features of same class should lie very close to each other in Euclidean space. This constraint enforces the features of the perturbed image to lie closer to the class center and far from the classifier boundary, thus improving its robustness. Compactness enforces the features to be bounded and lie in a closed space.
It restricts the extent to which a feature for perturbed image can move, making it less likely to cross the class boundary.
To enforce centrality and compactness constraints to the network features, we explore different loss functions such as CenterLoss [28] and L 2 -Softmax Loss [22] . The Cen-terLoss establishes centrality by penalizing the distance between the features from the last layer of the network and their corresponding class centers. L 2 -Softmax Loss establishes both compactness and centrality by constraining the features to lie on a hypersphere of fixed radius, before applying the softmax loss. We show that the robustness of CNNs to adversarial attacks can be improved by training the network with these loss functions.
Using these insights, we propose a novel convolution method, called power convolution, that significantly enhances a network's robustness by enforcing layer-wise centrality and compactness. A power convolution module applies L 2 -normalization and scaling operations to every input patch before applying the convolutional kernel in a sliding window fashion. Power Convolutional Networks (PCNs), built using these modules, are highly robust compared to a typical CNN. Figure 1 shows some sample images and corresponding adversarial attacks generated using Deep-Fool [18] to fool a CNN and a PCN. The adversarial samples for PCN can easily be distinguished from the original samples by a human observer. The paper makes the following key contributions:
• We explore two important properties of the features learned by a network, namely Centrality and Compactness, and show their necessity in making a network robust to adversarial attacks.
• We propose to use CenterLoss and L2-Softmax Loss as defense mechanisms against adversarial perturbations.
• We propose power convolutional modules that increases the network stability by applying the Centrality and Compactness properties to features at every layer in the network.
• We achieve new state-of-the-art results on defending white-box as well as black-box attacks.
Related Works
A lot of research has gone into generating adversarial perturbations to fool a deep network. Szegedy et al. [26] first showed the existence of adversarial perturbations in CNNs and proposed a L-BFGS based optimization scheme to generate the same. Later, Goodfellow et al. [6] proposed Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) to generate adversarial samples. DeepFool [18] attack iteratively finds a minimal perturbation required to cause a network to mis-classify. Other recently proposed adversarial attacks include Jacobian-based Saliency Map Approach (JSMA) [20] , Carlini-Wagner (CW) attack [2] , Universal Perturbations [17] , etc.
To safeguard the network from adversarial attacks, re-searchers have focused on two approaches: 1) Adversarial Detection, and 2) Adversarial Defense. Methods based on adversarial detection [14, 15, 7, 5] attempt to detect an adversarial sample before passing it through the network for inference. These methods put an extra effort in designing a separate adversarial detector which itself has the risk of being fooled by the attacker. Recently, Carlini and Wagner [1] showed that most of the adversarial detectors are ineffective and can be bypassed. The methods based on adversarial defense aim at improving the network's robustness to classify adversarial samples correctly. One way to achieve robustness is by simultaneously training the network with clean and adversarial samples [6, 16, 24, 11] . These methods are stable to the attack on which they are trained, but ineffective against a different attack. Preprocessing the input to nullify the adversarial effect is another way to defend the network [4, 9] . Few methods have focused on modifying the network topology or optimization procedure for adversarial defense. Gu and Rigazio [8] proposed Deep Contractive Network that adds a smoothness penalty on the partial derivatives at every layer. Cisse et al. [3] proposed Parseval Networks that improves robustness by enforcing the weight matrices of convolutional and linear layers to be Parseval tight frames. Papernot et al. [21] showed that knowledge distillation with high temperature parameter can be used as defense against adversarial samples. Warde et al. [27] showed that a similar robustness as defensive distillation can be obtained by training the network with smooth labels. Zantedeschi et al. [29] used Bounded ReLU activations to enhance network's stable to adversarial perturbations.
While these methods have focused on improving defense to adversarial attacks in general, most of them have focused on white box attacks and incur additional computational overhead during training. In this work, we propose an approach to achieve adversarial defense in CNN using power convolutions which can be seamlessly integrated into any existing deep network architecture. We further demonstrate its effectiveness against both white box and black box adversarial attacks.
Adversarial Defense
In this section, we prove the necessity of centrality and compactness of the network features for improved robustness to adversarial attacks. Let x be the input image. Letx andx r be the corresponding feature vectors from networkŝ k andk r respectively. Both these networks have same architecture and number of parameters. Let the classification score for a feature t be given by:
For an input perturbation η, the corresponding perturbations in feature space areη andη r for networksk andk r respectively. From [18] we know that the direction of a typical adversarial perturbation in feature space is opposite to the classifier weight vector W . The perturbationsη andη r can be rewritten as:η
where γ and γ r are the magnitudes of the perturbationsη andη r obtained from the respective networks,Ŵ is the unitvector of the classifier weight. Let E x denote the expectation operator over the input data. We say that the network k r is more robust thank if the expected classification score for the adversarial inputs is higher withk r , i.e.,
Since the networksk andk r have similar architecture and performance accuracy, it is reasonable to assume that the expected classification scores for the unperturbed inputs is same for both of them:
Using (3), (2) reduces to:
Using (1), we can rewrite (4) as:
(6) implies that a networkk r is more robust or harder to be fooled than networkk if the magnitude of the generated perturbation in the feature space is smaller fork r compared tok. Using the above equations, we justify the centrality and compactness properties in the following propositions.
Proposition 1 (Centrality): Letμ andμ r be the class centers in feature space for the networksk andk r respectively. k r is more robust thank if:
Proof: Using condition (7), we need to show that (6) holds. Expanding (7), we get:
Using 7,
Expanding (9), we get:
Subtracting (8) from (10), we obtain:
Since E x [x −μ] = E x [x r −μ r ] = 0, using linearity of expectation operator the second term from both L.H.S and R.H.S of (11) gets eliminated and we get:
Substituting the perturbations from (1) in (12), we get
which is equivalent to (6) . This shows that centrality improves robustness against adversarial attacks.
Proposition 2 (Compactness): Let M be a fixed constant. k r is more robust thank ifx r lies inside a p-norm ball:
Proof: Using (14) for the adversarial samples, we get:
(15) implies that the adversarial perturbation will be clipped if the p-norm of the perturbed feature exceeds a constant. The bounded perturbationη r can be written in terms of unbounded perturbationη as:
Using equivalence of norms, (16) implies that:
Substituting the perturbations from (1) in (17), we obtain (6) which proves that compactness makes a network more robust to adversarial attacks.
Robust Loss Functions
In this section, we provide an overview of Center-Loss [28] and L 2 -Softmax Loss [22] , which enhance the network's robustness to adversarial attacks by following the principles of centrality and compactness.
CenterLoss
The CenterLoss was proposed by Wen et al. [28] for the task of discriminative face verification. It simultaneously learns a center for deep features of each class and penalizes the distances between the deep features and their corresponding class centers. The structure of the loss function is shown in (18) :
where x i is the i th deep feature and c yi is the center for the class label y i , W j is the weight and b j is the bias corresponding to the class j, and m, n are the batch-size and number of classes respectively. The first term is the typical softmax loss that encourages inter-class separability. The second term is the distance penalty that ensures the closeness of intra-class deep features. The hyper-parameter λ controls the trade-off between intra-class and inter-class variability.
We use CenterLoss as a defense to adversarial attacks owing to its centrality property. Experimental results suggest that CenterLoss improves network robustness compared to traditional softmax loss.
L 2 -Softmax Loss
L 2 -Softmax loss was recently proposed by Ranjan et al. [22] for improving the task of face verification. The loss imposes a constraint on the deep features to lie on a hypersphere of a fixed radius, before applying the softmax penalty. The loss is defined as:
where x i is the i th deep feature for the class label y i , W j is the weight and b j is the bias corresponding to the class j, α is a positive scalar parameter, and m, n are the batch-size and number of classes respectively. The features are first normalized to unit length and then scaled by α before passing it through the softmax classifier. Constraining the features to lie on a hypersphere reduces the intra-class variations and enhances the inter-class separability.
Unlike CenterLoss, the L 2 -Softmax Loss possesses both centrality and compactness properties. The compactness comes from the fact that the L 2 -norm of the feature vector is always constant and equal to α. The centrality is inherently implied since the softmax loss enforces the feature vectors of class j to lie closer to the point αŴ j on the hypersphere, whereŴ j denotes the unit weight vector for the j th class.
From Figure 2 , we can see that the features trained using softmax loss do not satisfy the centrality and compactness properties. The CenterLoss enforces centrality, while L 2 -Softmax Loss enforces both centrality and compactness on the CNN features. Experimental analysis (see section 6) shows that both CenterLoss and L 2 -Softmax Loss are more robust to adversarial attacks than softmax loss.
Power Convolution
The L 2 -Softmax loss applies the centrality and compactness properties only to the deep features from the last layer of CNN. We propose to extend these properties to features from the intermediate layers of CNNs as well. A typical CNN is a hierarchy of convolutional and fully-connected layers stacked with non-linear activation functions after every layer. A discrete convolution is a linear function applied on a patch of a signal in a sliding window fashion. Let W be the convolution kernel of size 2k + 1, x n,k be an input patch defined as:
where x(n) is the n th element of input vector x. The convolution operation is represented as:
where y(n) is the n th element of the output vector y. To enforce centrality and compactness in convolutional layers, we need to ensure that every input patch at a given location is first L 2 -normalized and scaled before multiplying with the convolutional kernel W . Formally, we want the convolution output (ỹ(n)) at position n to be:
where δ is a small constant added to avoid division by zero. We call this new method of patch-normalized convolution as power convolution. A toy example depicting the difference between typical convolution and power convolution is shown in Figure 3 . In a deep CNN, the convolution kernel is typically applied to high dimensional feature maps. Normalizing every feature patch before multiplying with the convolutional kernel is computationally expensive and redundant, since the patches are overlapping. To implement power convolution efficiently in a deep network, we propose a power convolution module (shown in Figure 4 ). We split the input feature map into two branches. The first branch carries out the traditional convolution operation with parameters of size k × k, without bias addition. The second branch first computes the sum of squares along the channel dimension of the input. Subsequently, it is convolved with a k × k kernel containing fixed value of all ones. This step provides the squared L 2 -Norm of sliding-window patches for every output location in a feature map. We perform element-wise square-root on top of it and add a small constant δ = 0.01. Lastly, the convolutional output from the first branch is divided element-wise with the output from the second branch. We then scale the final output with a learnable scalar parameter α and add the bias term. The power convolution module uses just one extra parameter (α) compared to the traditional convolutional layer. Since the linear operation in fully-connected layers is a special case of convolution, the power convolution operation for these layers results in L 2 -normalization and scaling of the feature vectors. It constrains the features to lie on a hypersphere of fixed radius (α), before applying the dot product with the layer parameters. Deep networks with power convolution modules are termed as Power Convolutional Networks (PCNs). They follow the centrality and compactness property at every layer of the network, which greatly enhances their robustness against multiple kinds of adversarial attacks. The L 2 -Softmax Loss inherently gets applied in PCNs.
Experiments
We evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed defense methods on MNIST [13] and CIFAR10 [10] datasets. MNIST [13] dataset contains 60, 000 training and 10, 000 test images of handwritten digits. The images are 28×28 dimensional with values in [0, 1]. CIFAR10 [10] dataset contains 50, 000 training and 10, 000 test images of 10 classes. The images are 32 × 32 × 3 dimensional, with values scaled between 0 and 1.
We use two well-known methods for crafting adversarial attacks: Fast Gradient Sign Method [6] (FGSM) and Deep-Fool [18] . FGSM attack adds the sign of the gradient to the input, scaled by the factor as shown in equation 23
where x is the input image,x is the crafted adversarial image, ∇ x J(θ, x, y)) is gradient of the cost function with respect to the input. This method is very fast, since it uses a single backward step to generate the attack. On the other hand, DeepFool [18] iteratively finds the minimal perturbation required to mis-classify the input in the direction of the nearest class boundary. Though being slower than FGSM [6] , DeepFool [18] can generate adversarial images with smaller magnitude of perturbations, which are indistinguishable to human observer. We use the Foolbox [23] library to generate these attacks. We also provide experimental analysis using other adversarial attacks in the supplementary.
The network architectures used for training are provided in Table 1 . For training on MNIST [13] , we use the architecture proposed by Papernot et al. [21] . The learning rate is set to 0.1 for the first thirty epochs, and decreased by a factor of 0.1 after every ten epochs. We train the network for fifty epochs. For training on CIFAR10 [10] , we use the standard VGG11 [25] network. The convolutional layers use 3 × 3 kernels with padding of one. We start with a learning rate of 0.1 which is decreased by a factor of 0.2 after 60, 120 and 160 epochs. We train the network for 200 epochs. We use SGD with momentum (0.9) and weight de-cay (5×10 −4 ) for all our training. We use mean subtraction of 0.5 as a pre-processing step. We compare and evaluate the following defense methods against adversarial attacks: 
White-Box Attacks
In a white-box attack, the attacker has full access to the network to be attacked. For each of the defense methods, we generate FGSM [6] and DeepFool [18] attack for MNIST [13] and CIFAR10 [10] testset. Table 2 provides the classification accuracy of various defense methods on adversarial examples crafted using FGSM [6] for MNIST [13] testset. We perform evaluations for four different values {0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4}. Higher value of leads to larger perturbation, thus decreasing the accuracy. Table 3 . Accuracy (%) on CIFAR10 [10] for FGSM [6] attack (with different out of 255). The best and second-best accuracies are shown in bold.
Tables 4 and 5 provide the classification accuracies of different defense methods against DeepFool [18] attack, on MNIST and CIFAR10 respectively. Since, DeepFool is an iterative attack, it will mostly find a perturbation to fool the network. To evaluate using DeepFool, the iterations are carried out until the adversarial perturbation (η) causes the network to mis-classify, or the ratio of L 2 -norm of the perturbation (η) and the input (x) reaches the max-residue-ratio (d), as given in equation 24.
The evaluations are carried out with different values of d = {0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4,0.5}. From Table 4 , we find that LS and PCN perform comparably against DeepFool attack on MNIST. The model PCN+LS achieves the best performance since it leverages the qualities of both LS and PCN models. On CIFAR10 dataset, PCN performs better than LS against DeepFool attack (see Table 5 ). The effect of label smoothing is less for CIFAR10, since the probability scores are lower owing to the toughness of the dataset. The models PCN and PCN+LS significantly outperform other defense methods against DeepFool attack. Table 5 . Accuracy (%) for DeepFool [18] attack (with different max-residue-ratio d) on CIFAR10 [10] testset. The best and second-best accuracies are represented in bold.
We also provide a quantitative measure of model's robustness against DeepFool [18] attack in Table 6 . The robustness measure ρ adv (k) for a classifierk is computed using 25.
where r x,k is the generated perturbation, x is the input image, and E x is the expectation over the entire test data. Similar to the classification accuracy, the robustness of LS is higher than PCN for MNIST but lower for CIFAR10. PCN+LS is the most robust model for both the datasets.
Adversarial Training
Goodfellow et al. [6] proposed to train the network simultaneously with original and crafted adversarial images to improve it's stability. We analyze the effect of adversarial 
Black-Box Attacks
In a typical black-box attack, the attacker has no information about the network architecture, its parameters or the training dataset. The attacker can query the network and Table 10 . Accuracy (%) on CIFAR10 [10] against transfer attacks crafted using FGSM ( = 8 255 ). * indicates that the adversarial attacks were crafted and tested on the same network, causing maximum impact.
can get the output class label for a given input. We use the black-box attack proposed by Papernot et al. [19] to evaluate the defense models. We treat our defense models as oracle, and train substitute models using LeNet [12] architecture as described in [19] . Table 11 reports the accuracy of the defense models against FGSM attack generated using the corresponding substitute models. We observe that PCN+LS and CL models are most robust to practical blackbox attacks. PCN comparable to CL and is consistent across different values. Table 11 . Accuracy (%) against practical black-box FGSM attack (with different ) on MNIST [13] testset. The best and second-best accuracies are represented in bold.
Transferability of Adversarial Samples
It has been shown in [19] that adversarial examples generated on one type of network can be used to fool a different type of network. This makes it easier for the attackers to generate adversarial samples using their independently trained models. Our defense model should be immune to the attacks generated by itself, as well to the attacks generated from a different network. Tables 9 and 10 report the accuracies on transfered attacks between different defense models. We find that the networks are more vulnerable to the transfered attacks generated using the baseline model SM. Among all the models, PCN and PCN+LS are most robust to transferred attacks. Also, the attacks generated using these models are less likely to fool other models. This shows that PCN and PCN+LS provide a two-way defense. Firstly, these models would be less vulnerable to any unknown adversarial attacks. Secondly, the attacks generated using these models would be less harmful for any unknown network.
Conclusion
In this paper, we show that feature centrality and compactness can improve a network's robustness against adversarial attacks. CenterLoss, that follows centrality, and L 2 -Softmax Loss, that follows both centrality and compactness, provide better robustness compared to naive softmax loss. These properties are applied to each layer of the network using power convolutional modules, which significantly reduces the network's vulnerability to adversarial perturbations. Label smoothing provides an additional robustness to the network. In future, we would further analyze the necessary properties for a network to be robust, and build sophisticated architectures that are provably robust to adversarial attacks.
